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ABSTRACT
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that “the first command” of all self-regarding duties
is to know our “heart.” Kant ostensibly identifies our heart with our moral disposition. Strangely,
this appears to be precisely the sort of knowledge that, elsewhere, Kant claims is epistemically
inaccessible to us. While the more sophisticated attempts to resolve this difficulty succeed in
situating an injunction to know the quality of one’s disposition within a Kantian epistemic
framework, no account is wholly successful in explaining why Kant takes self-knowledge to be a
necessary condition of virtue. To make sense of the priority Kant assigns to the pursuit of selfknowledge, I argue that it is essential to understand the role of what has been called “generic”
self-knowledge in Kant’s moral philosophy. I proceed to defend the place Kant grants moral selfknowledge in his moral philosophy, primarily by developing a Kantian account of such “generic”
self-knowledge.
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1
INTRODUCTION
Those familiar with Kant's moral philosophy primarily through the Groundwork are often
surprised when they learn of the extent to which Kant emphasizes the importance of selfknowledge in his later treatments of ethics. The first and most obvious reason for such surprise is
that Kant does not make explicit mention of self-knowledge in his early writings on moral
philosophy. The second is that, in many places in the Groundwork, Kant seems, to a fault,
unconcerned with the complexities of human psychology and motivation.
Kant’s emphasis on self-knowledge, while represented throughout his lectures and, to a
limited extent, in the Critiques, culminates in the Metaphysics of Morals. There, Kant declares
that self-knowledge is the “First Command of all duties to Oneself.” In order to address your
self-regarding duties, you must attempt to
know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself, not in terms of your natural perfection (your fitness or
unfitness for all sorts of discretionary or even commanded ends) but rather in terms of
your moral perfection in relation to your duty. That is, know your heart—whether it is
good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure, and what can be
imputed to you as belonging originally to the substance of a human being or as derived
(acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral condition (MM 6:441).1
This dense passage raises at least four questions: first, what is the “heart”? Second, what does it
mean to “know, scrutinize or fathom” it? Third, what makes one's heart good or evil? Finally,
why are we commanded, in the first place, to know ourselves? The first question concerns the
proper object of self-knowledge; the second, the method by which self-knowledge is best
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In this paper, references will be made according to the following method. Citations from Kant’s works will be
made parenthetically according to convention: Citations from the Critique of Pure Reason will be located by the
first and second edition pagination included in major English translations of the work, and the title will be
abbreviated, KrV. Other references to Kant's work will be located by Academy pagination, and their titles
abbreviated as indicated the first time they are cited. Works by other authors will be cited in footnotes. The
translation of The Metaphysics of Morals is Gregor's: Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Mary J.
Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.
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achieved; the third, the criteria by which we are to assess the information we obtain about
ourselves according to the proper methods; and the fourth, the purpose of self-knowledge.
This thesis has three main parts. The first part considers each of the above questions
concerning the nature and place of moral self-knowledge within Kant's philosophical framework.
Toward this end, I review the small but growing body of literature on Kantian moral selfknowledge. I then argue, in the second part, that each extant account of Kantian moral selfknowledge in the literature fails to articulate a satisfying answer to the fourth question above.
That is, no account is able to provide an adequate account of why Kant thinks morality requires
self-knowledge at all. Finally, in the third part, I argue that only by carefully attending to what
has been referred to in the literature as “generic” self-knowledge, or what Kant, in the above,
calls knowledge of ourselves “as belonging originally to the substance of a human being,” can
we make sense of the practical importance of self-knowledge within Kant's ethical framework. I
attempt to advance an interpretation of Kant's central claims regarding the role of self-knowledge
in the ethical life that is both faithful to Kant's writings and that is itself a philosophically
attractive defense of his controversial position that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of
virtue.
SECTION 1: KANT’S FIRST COMMAND

When Kant claims that our self-regarding duties command us to know ourselves, what,
precisely, is he telling us to know? Because Kant’s first command concerns our moral lives, what
we are commanded to know about ourselves must be, in some sense, morally relevant. It is
reasonable to think that self-knowledge is morally relevant when it justifiably affects or serves as
a basis for certain (positive or negative) moral judgments. Ostensibly, for Kant, the proper object
of self-knowledge is one’s disposition. I then introduce and articulate Kant’s thesis of self-
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opacity, a problem that is born out of Kant’s epistemic and anthropological commitments. I
observe that, paradoxically, on this reading, the self is opaque precisely where we are instructed,
by Kant’s “first command,” to know it. Finally, I review the literature concerning Kant’s “first
command,” what it requires of Kantian moral agents and how, despite the opacity of the self,
Kantian moral agents might come to discharge the requirements of this odd command. This, in
turn, will prepare the ground for an analysis of the important function that Kant takes selfknowledge to have in the good life.
1.1 “Know Thy Heart”: The Object of Self-Knowledge
In the passage quoted above, Kant claims that morality commands us to know our “heart”
in terms of whether it is good or evil. The metaphorical language is suggestive, but imprecise.
Fortunately, in the same passage, Kant links the question of whether one's heart is good or evil to
the question of “whether the source of [one's] actions is pure or impure” (Ibid). This implies that
one’s heart is the source of one’s actions. What our self-regarding duties command us to know,
then, amounts to whether the source of our actions is pure or impure.
Kant consistently holds that the source of one's actions is one's character—or, as Kant
likes to put it, one’s disposition, or Gesinnung (R 6:21-2, KpV 5:81, 5:84, 5:89, MM 6:393, GMS,
4:406).2 Kant maintains that one's disposition is either pure or it is impure (R 6:23).3 If one's
disposition is impure, then the source of one's actions is evil. If one's disposition is pure, then the
source of one's actions is good (R 6:36).4 As Kelly Coble puts it, a pure Gesinnung is “a maxim
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Kant, Immanuel. Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: And Other Writings. Ed. Allen W. Wood and
Giovanni George Di. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. (Hereafter R); Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical
Reason. Ed. Mary J. Gregor and Andrews Reath. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. (Hereafter, KpV). Kant,
Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary J Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
(Hereafter, GMS).
3
This is referred to in the literature and by Kant himself as rigorism. For a defense of Kantian rigorism, see Coble,
Kelly. "Kant's Dynamic Theory of Character." Kantian Review 7 (2003): 38-71. 27 July 2012.
4
See also: Coble, pp.. 39, Frierson, Patrick R. "Character and Evil in Kant's Moral Anthropology." Journal of the
History of Philosophy 44.4 (2006): 623-34. Wood, Allen W. Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
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in which duty is the ultimate incentive, overriding self-love in all situations in which the
incentives conflict,” while an impure Gesinnung is an underlying maxim in which self-love is the
ultimate incentive, overriding the incentive of duty in situations in which the incentives conflict.5
Morality requires that we make the satisfaction of our inclinations conditional upon our having
fulfilled our duties.6 If we fulfill this requirement, our heart is “good.” The command to know
whether one's heart is good or evil is, at least ostensibly, identical to the command to know
whether one has succeeded in cultivating a pure disposition.
1.2 Self-Opacity
That the “first command” of all duties that we have to ourselves requires that we attempt
to know the status of the disposition underlying our actions has raised some eyebrows. After all,
Kant is elsewhere adamant that we cannot have such knowledge. In the second Critique, for
example, Kant writes that no example “of exact observation of the law” can be found in
experience (KpV 5:47). In the Groundwork, he emphasizes that, “no certain example can be cited
of the disposition to act from pure duty” (GMS 4:407). Finally, and dramatically, in the
Metaphysics of Morals, Kant declares that “a human being cannot see into the depths of his own
heart so as to be quite certain in even a single action of the purity of his moral intention and the
sincerity of his disposition” (MM 6:392). Accordingly, we have no choice but to conclude that
“the depths of the human heart are unfathomable” (MM 6:447).

1999. Guyer, Paul. "The Obligation to Be Virtuous: Kant's Conception of the Tugendverpflichtung." Social
Philosophy and Policy 27 (2010): 206-32.
5
Coble, 39.
6
Importantly, this doctrine does not imply that one must fulfill all of one’s duties before one can satisfy any of one’s
inclinations. For Kant, positive duties (such as duties to help others and to develop our talents) are wide or
imperfect duties; this means that they can be discharged and ordered in any number of ways, and also that what
we do to discharge them is largely up to us. Kant’s point is only that, when a token inclination conflicts with a
token duty, persons with virtuous dispositions subordinate their inclinations to what morality requires. Thanks to
Eric Wilson for pointing out this worry.
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These passages are characteristic of Kant’s general insistence that the self is
fundamentally opaque. Our motives, and, indeed, our dispositions, are not the sorts of things that
are straightforwardly accessible to us. This opacity is not just the result of the complexity of
human motivation. In addition, Kant claims that, as human beings, we have a pernicious
tendency to deceive ourselves. Self-deception takes many different forms, but one common
manifestation of this tendency is our propensity to “ascribe to ourselves, without proof, a worth”
that we do not possess (LE 27:610).7 Our interest in appearing morally upright entices us to
“throw dust in our own eyes,” in order to blind us from the truth of our moral condition (R 6:38).
For simplicity, with Owen Ware, I will refer to this general line of thought as Kant’s Opacity
Thesis. It is this thesis, in various forms, that has led many to question the coherence of a
command that would require us to judge the constitution of the disposition that underlies our
actions.
In light of the above considerations, most accounts of the Kant’s first command attempt
to resolve the apparent tension between Kant's insistence that we can never truly know ourselves
and his claim that we are commanded to do so. That is, they attempt to answer the question of
how it is that we are supposed to know our disposition—by what means are we scrutinize, or
fathom our hearts—given (a) our tendency to deceive ourselves and (b) the fact that our
experience “contains merely appearances of the disposition that the moral law is concerned with”
(KpV 5:99). Having laid the ground for a discussion of Kant's perplexing complex of views, we
now turn to these accounts, each of which take it that the primary (and perhaps the only) object
7

Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics. Ed. Peter Lauchlan Heath and J.B. Schneewind. New York: Cambridge UP,
1997. (Hereafter, LE). It is worth noting that, even if the self-deception worry were successfully removed, the
constitution of our disposition, due to Kant's transcendental epistemology, might still lie outside our grasp. This
would be true if the disposition (as is plausible) were an aspect of our noumenal, rather than our empirical
character. There are reasons, however, to think that noumenal ignorance is not a significant worry for Kant’s
views on self-knowledge. In any case, it makes little sense to consider the merits of such views until the more
pressing problem of self-deception is resolved.
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of self-knowledge is our own moral condition, that is, whether or not our heart is “good” or
“evil.”
1.3 Reconciling Kant's First Command with Self-Opacity: Some Recent Attempts
One way to resolve the difficulty delineated above is to claim that Kant does not mean to
rule out the possibility that we might attain knowledge of our disposition as such. Rather, in
acknowledging the possibility of self-deception, he is merely criticizing one rather
straightforward account of how we might attempt to know ourselves. Generally, the view in
question asserts that human beings are capable of unproblematically determining what motives
they have for acting via introspection
So understood, Kant’s thesis self-opacity might be interpreted rather narrowly, intended
only to guard against one naïve method according to which we might attempt to understand the
source of our actions. On the introspective account, in attempting to know what motivates us, we
“look inward,” and simply discern the motive we have from acting against a backdrop of other
psychological and intentional states. The problem is that, in doing so, we are wont to find “just
what we ourselves have put there.”8 That is, rather than learning what actually has motivated us
through introspection, we are prone to engage in a sort of post-hoc rationalization of what it is
that we have done. Notice that if Kant’s Opacity Thesis is merely targeting the view that we have
direct cognitive access to the state of our disposition, as long as we “know ourselves” by means
other than introspection, the tension between Kant’s Opacity Thesis and his first command
disappears. This might seem a strange solution. By what other means might we come to know

8

See esp. Wood, Allen. Kant’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge UP: 1999; pp. 201.
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the quality of our disposition? Owen Ware considers the possibility that we might know our
disposition inferentially.9
Since we are prone to deceive ourselves regarding the quality of our intentions and the
principles we consciously take ourselves to act upon, we are required to attempt to know our
disposition by examining our actions over time. Such a process will gradually allow us to judge
the quality of our disposition without requiring us to have what we cannot have: direct cognitive
access to our disposition, or the source of our actions. Such an inferential view helps make sense
of Kant's claim that self-knowledge requires the comparison “of our past actions with their
dutifulness” over time (LE 27:608). This account avoids the psychologically naïve mistake of
taking our conscious intentions to accurately represent our motivations and also seems to
alleviate the tension that appears characteristic of Kant's position.
Indeed, it has been well-documented that, for Kant, principles, not actions, are the proper
objects of moral judgment. In the Religion, Kant argues that when we judge a human being to be
evil, we do not do so because he “performs actions that are evil...but because these are so
constituted that they allow the inference of evil maxims in him” (R 6:20). When we judge our
own character or that of another human being as being morally bad, we do based on the
assumption that the action a person takes is indicative of something deeper: a morally deficient
personal principle, or maxim. But the chain of inference does not stop with maxims. Each
maxim that a person adopts is indicative, in turn, of an even more general maxim or principle,
and so on, until we reach the level of one's general disposition to either subordinate one's pursuit
of happiness to one's pursuit of virtue or one's pursuit of virtue to one's pursuit of happiness
(ibid). So, on an inferential account of Kantian self-knowledge, we observe our actions over

9

Ware, Owen. “The Duty of Self-knowledge.” Philosophical and Phenomenological Research. LXXIX.3 (2009):
671-97.
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time; from our actions, we infer our maxims; finally, from our maxims, we infer the quality of
our disposition.
Initially, this looks like a promising way to reconcile Kant’s First Command with his
Opacity Thesis. However, Kant elsewhere observes that from a given action, an inference to any
number of maxims is possible: “between maxim and deed,” Kant writes, “there is still a wide
gap” (R 6:47). Not all maxims suggested by an action will represent the principle that actually
motivated the agent to act. An agent might genuinely have adopted a maxim even when such a
principle is not easily “read off” of her actions. Perhaps, due to the influence of a “stepmotherly
nature,” she is unable to carry the principle of her will through to action (see: GMS 4:396). The
problem with the inferential view, then, is twofold: First, actions admit of several different and
conflicting interpretations. Second, the proper interpretation of a given action may be unavailable
to the observer (even when the observer is the agent herself). Thus, in Dosteovsky's Crime and
Punishment, when Raskolnikov gives his last twenty roubles to the grieving family of a dead
drunkard, his action is interpreted by at least one other as having represented his desire to solicit
the services of a prostitute. While Raskolnikov knows this to be false, he is not entirely sure,
himself, whether his giving was motivated by guilt for having committed a murder, or by his
appropriate sympathy for the poor family.10
Onora O'Neill develops (though she eventually rejects) a modified inferential view that is
capable of resolving these difficulties. Though Kant claims that we would be naïve to
unreflectively take our consciously formulated maxims to represent our actual motivations, he
never denies that we do have introspective access to maxims insofar as we consciously represent
them to ourselves prior to, in the process of, or after acting. So, O’Neill observes, we come

10

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. Crime and Punishment. Trans. Constance Garnett. New York: Modern Library, 1950, pp.
339-394.
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closest to knowledge of our disposition by paying careful attention to the maxims that we
consciously represent, in addition to our behavior over time.11
O’Neill’s modification of Ware’s inferential account helps make sense of Kant's claim
that the task of self-knowledge requires “justum sui aestimium,” or just self-assessment. Just selfassessment consists in judging our moral worth by testing the maxim of our action “by the extent
to which it is undertaken, not merely in accordance with, but for the sake of the law alone” (LE
27:609). Clearly, for this procedure to yield the best results, we must pay attention to our states
insofar as they are represented through introspection. Doing so narrows the body of eligible
maxims implied by our actions, and, additionally, allows the categorical imperative to guide
action before the fact. O’Neill’s position, accordingly, requires that we alternate back and forth
between testing our consciously formulated maxims according to the categorical imperative and
inferring from our actions (once committed) those maxims that might have actually moved us to
act. As agents, we are then able to compare and match those maxims inferred from action with
those that we represent to ourselves prior to or in the process of acting. From there, we infer
whether or not the maxims suggested by this procedure imply that we have made the satisfaction
of our inclinations contingent upon the demands of the moral law. We are left with the necessary
resources to make an evaluative judgment concerning the purity of our disposition by combining
the cognitive tools of introspection and inference.
Ware argues that sophisticated inferential accounts of Kantian self-knowledge (such as
O’Neill’s) still sit uneasily with Kant's Opacity Thesis. Recall that the problem of self-opacity
results, not only from the complexity of human motivation, but also from the human propensity
for self-deception. Even if we rely on some combination of introspection and inference to

11

O'Neill Onora. “Kant's Virtues.” How Should One Live? Essays on the Virtues, pp. 93.Comp. Roger Crisp.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
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determine our maxims and their conformity with what morality requires, it seems that we will
still be prone to deceive ourselves, to see ourselves as being morally better than we actually are.
To see this, suppose my colleague is competing for a promotion. She is struggling to meet
a deadline for an important assignment. If she does not meet this deadline, she is unlikely to be
promoted. Since her and I have a good working relationship, I have a vested interest in seeing
her promoted. (Suppose that if she is promoted, I know that she will assign me those projects that
carry with them generous expense accounts.) Observing that she is struggling to meet her
deadline, I consider offering to watch her children for a weekend, despite having work of my
own to do. Before making the offer, I judge that this act is morally required of me. That said the
act itself is not something that I desire to do. So construed, the maxim of my action, that which
motivates me to overcome my own desire for a working weekend at home, is to “help others
where I can.” Now, I make the offer. Stepping back, I consider two (of many) possible
interpretations of my action. On the one hand, I might have actually been motivated to act by
purely moral concerns; on the other hand, perhaps what actually motivated me to act was my
more selfish (long-term) interest in seeing my colleague promoted; my maxim was, actually, to
“help others when it is advantageous to me in the long run.”
Since one very important condition of my experience of self-approbation consists in my
being motivated to act for the right kinds of reasons, the argument goes, I am more likely to
select the former interpretation of my action. I am more likely to interpret my motives so as to
represent myself as having been motivated by purely moral concerns. So, it is reasonable to think
that the problem of self-deception, if mitigated by requiring that we consider both the maxims we
represent to ourselves during action and the implications of our actions themselves when
attempting to evaluate our disposition, is not thereby wholly resolved. The point is not that I have
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done anything immoral by acting on this more self-interested principle, but, rather, that the
question of whether or not I have subordinated my interests to moral considerations is left open,
even after employing the methodology suggested in the early parts of O'Neill's essay.
One might worry, at this point, that the problem of self-deception is wholly intractable.
Try as we might to assess ourselves impartially, our interest in appearing morally upright will
always preclude our ability to obtain the sort of self-knowledge that Kant is after when he says
that we are commanded to know hearts. In order to resolve this deeper worry, Ware invokes
Kant's conception of conscience. Conscience, according to Ware, prevents the tendency of selfdeception from corrupting the pursuit of self-knowledge “all the way down.” In general, Ware
holds that, because Kant holds an “erring conscience” to be an absurdity, agents may be said to
know themselves by subjecting their disposition to the judgment of conscience.
According to Ware, Kant thinks conscience allows us to perform two main functions.
First, the agent submits her behavior to the judgment of conscience. Her conscience then impels
her to make a “higher order judgment of whether or not [she] has properly incorporated moral
principles into her actions.”12 In this task, conscience makes a judgment as to whether or not an
agent’s maxims accord with the potential purity of her disposition. Has she successfully
subordinated the pursuit of her interests to the commands of morality? In answering this
question, and hence in making this sort of first-order judgment, conscience can easily lead
individuals to make mistaken judgments regarding the quality of their character. Indeed, one
might be mistaken for any number of reasons, and among these is that, because of the desire to
be morally praiseworthy, an individual might judge that her maxims are constitutive of a pure
disposition, when in fact they are not.13

12
13

Ware, 692.
Ware, 691-2.
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If this is the only role that conscience plays, or the only type of judgment that conscience
is capable of producing, then it is hard to make sense of Kant's claim that “an erring conscience
is an absurdity.”14 But this is not the only role that conscience plays, nor are these the only sorts
of judgments that conscience can produce. In its second role, conscience produces a judgment as
to “whether I have consciously examined my duties or not.”15 It is in producing these kinds of
judgments that conscience cannot err. While we might deceive ourselves in attributing to our
disposition a purity that it does not have in order to avoid the harsh judgment of conscience, and
while we can never be truly certain that conscience, in its first function, has yielded the correct
judgment regarding the quality of our disposition, we cannot mistake whether or not we have
honestly subjected ourselves to its judgment.
As Ware puts it, in this task, conscience accuses or acquits a person “exactly where [she]
is transparent: [her] sense of truthfulness.”16 As Kant puts it, “While I can indeed be mistaken at
times in objective judgment as to whether something is a duty or not, I cannot be mistaken in my
subjective judgment as to whether I have submitted it to my practical reason...for such a
judgment” (MM 6:401). While we can be mistaken about the condition of our disposition, we
cannot be mistaken that we have honestly tried to judge it. So, Ware reasons, the tension between
Kant’s Opacity Thesis and his command, “know thyself,” disappears because conscience is
capable of making at least one species of judgment that is not vulnerable to worries about selfdeception.
Notice, however (as Ware himself notices): Even when inferential accounts of Kantian
self-knowledge are supplemented with Kant's conception of conscience, we remain incapable of
obtaining certainty of the state of our disposition. We can approximate the purity or impurity of
14

Ware, 692.
Ibid.
16
Ware, 694.
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our hearts, and, as Ware puts it, we can even form a justified “belief” regarding whether or not
we have truly attempted to discharge our responsibility to “know” the latter, but we can never be
sure that we have gotten it right, that we have not deceived ourselves in subtle ways regarding its
actual constitution. This is an important implication of Kant's anthropology, not the result of
flawed interpretation. The more sophisticated reconstructions of Kant’s position on moral selfknowledge (such as Ware's) gesture at a satisfying answer to the question of how we are to
assess our “moral condition,” or the purity or impurity of “the source” of our actions in light of
the limits that Kant's anthropological and epistemological writings place upon our capacity to
derive accurate moral knowledge of ourselves. It just so happens that we are forced to conclude
that obtaining certainty regarding the state of our disposition is not possible.
SECTION 2: THE MORAL POINT OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE

So far, we have seen that Kant’s Opacity Thesis implies that we are unable to obtain
certainty regarding the quality of our disposition. The problem of self-deception is intractable.
Nevertheless, Kant asserts the importance of self-knowledge in the very same work in which he
seems to most adamantly deny its possibility (that is, in The Metaphysics of Morals). Extant
accounts of Kantian self-knowledge are committed to the view that the disposition is the primary
object of moral self-knowledge. But if this is the case, and it is impossible for us to judge
accurately the quality of our disposition, one might legitimately wonder why the virtuous agent
is commanded to strive after something impossible. Why not give up the pursuit of selfknowledge and just act? In this section, I develop this line of questioning in detail. I then provide
my own account of why Kant assigns fundamental importance to the pursuit of self-knowledge.

14
2.1 The Priority of Self-Knowledge
The main flaw in existing interpretations of the place of Kantian self-knowledge in
Kant’s moral philosophy is not that they are lacking in textual support, nor is it that they render
some aspect of Kant's moral philosophy unattractive. Indeed, each account emphasizes the extent
to which Kant's ethical thought is sensitive to the real limits of human knowledge and to the
complexities of human motivation. Rather, the problem with even the most sophisticated
accounts of the Kantian imperative to “know thyself” is that they fail to make any sense at all of
Kant's claim that pursuing self-knowledge is the first command of all duties that we have to
ourselves as moral beings. That is, they do a poor job of explaining the function that Kant
envisions self-knowledge playing in the good life.
What Kant means when he says self-knowledge is the first command of all duties to
oneself is not exactly clear. The claim suggests that, in some way, knowing one's heart is
something one must do before one is able to fulfill one's duties to oneself. For Kant, duties to
ourselves are conceptually prior to duties to others.17 We must take some account of our duties to
ourselves before we are in a position to address our duties to others. It is plausible to think that,
when Kant calls self-knowledge the first command of our self-regarding duties, he means to
claim that, just as duties to oneself must be, to an extent, pursued before duties to others can be
pursued, so too must self-knowledge be pursued before duties to ourselves can be pursued.
Vigilantius’s notes on Kant’s lectures confirm this reading: “for fulfillment of all moral duties, it
is first of all necessary to know oneself” (LE 27:608, my emphasis). This is significant. I am not
in a position to undertake the duties I have to myself unless I have pursued self-knowledge; I am

17

See, in particular: Denis, Lara. "Kant's Ethics and Duties to Oneself." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997):
321-48. 21 July 2012 and Timmermann, Jens. "Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended." Philosophy
81.3 (2006): 505-30. 2 July 2012.
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not in a position to fulfill one's duties to others unless I have taken account of the duties that I
have to myself.
This is a strong claim. It seems to be an especially odd position to take if (a) the object of
self-knowledge is our disposition, and (b) we can never achieve certain knowledge of our
disposition. If we are commanded to strive know the state of our disposition before we can
pursue our duties to ourselves (and, by extension, to others) and knowing the quality of our
disposition requires observation of our acts over time, we might never reach a point at which it is
appropriate for us to attempt to discharge our duties. 18 Even if we do reach such a point, it is not
sufficiently clear why knowledge of our character is necessary in order that we may act as
morality requires.
Indeed, in light of Kant’s own views about how one is supposed to act, it is hard to see
why he would take attaining knowledge of our disposition to be so important. In the
Groundwork, for example, Kant seems to claim that we should approach our duties by (a) testing
our maxims against the categorical imperative, and then (b) adopting or refraining from adopting
any maxims that are required or forbidden by this process (GMS 4:421-424).19 And, as O'Neill
notes, there's no reason that I need to know the quality of my disposition in order to strive to act
according to morally required maxims.20 To put the worry simply, it is far from clear why we
would need to know anything about our disposition in order to strive to fulfill our duties by the
process that Kant lays out in the Groundwork. Indeed, it might seem that the opposite is true.
Attempting to know our disposition might distract us from what matters in the ethical life: acting
as duty requires. The central question becomes, then, not whether Kant, in light of his sensitivity
18
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to the complexity of human motivation, can affirm some sort of responsibility to attain selfknowledge, but rather why Kant would claim that such an obligation is, in some sense, a
necessary condition for the fulfillment of our other duties given his other claims about moral
deliberation and action.
Since Kant does take the position that our duties require self-knowledge, there must be
something about self-knowledge that renders us fit to do what morality requires of us. Each
account of self-knowledge outlined above fails to shed light on this peculiar feature of Kant’s
claims about self-knowledge. The problem is not simply that extant accounts of Kantian selfknowledge do not mention why Kant takes self-knowledge to be so important; they do. They
almost universally quote passages from The Metaphysics of Morals where Kant claims that selfknowledge precludes arrogance and prevents misanthropy and self-loathing (MM 6:441). Yet,
provided self-knowledge has the object (and only the object) that these authors claim it has (our
disposition), this is odd. Why should I think that knowledge of my disposition will lead to me to
be more modest, while preventing misanthropy and self-hatred? It seems that no plausible
answer can be given to the question. If I find, on self-examination, that my disposition is pure, I
am likely to feel good about myself. This seems more likely to lead to pride than arrogance
(especially since Kant must countenance that this judgment might be mistaken). On the other
hand, if I find that my disposition is impure, I may well start to hate myself. So the question
remains: Why would we need to know whether or not we are good in order to bring it about that
we become better human beings?
Until this point, we have been working under the assumption that the point of selfknowledge is to evaluate the quality of our disposition. However, this assumption is dubitable.
Indeed, Emer O’Hagan develops an account of the purpose of Kantian self-knowledge that

17
begins by explicitly rejecting this assumption.21 O’Hagan recognizes that “In moral deliberation
a focus on the quality of one’s will interferes with the moral project of judging what is
required.”22 As a result, he concludes that self-knowledge, for Kant, is not intended to be an
evaluative enterprise; its function is not to assess one’s own moral goodness. Rather, echoing
Kant, he claims that “[t]he moral point of self-knowledge is to help to avoid self-illusion and to
develop moral objectivity.”23
We are to know our heart, according to O’Hagan, not in order to evaluate our disposition,
but, rather, in order to understand our particular inclinations and the way in which they will
induce us to act immorally: “if I know that I have certain tendencies to pride or pleasure then this
knowledge enables me to select casuisitical possibilities which will reveal, and may rule out of
play, those tendencies.”24 By comparing these tendencies with the requirements of the moral law,
we avoid self-illusion. So-conceived, self-knowledge “is a cognitive capacity developed by
keeping the theoretical foundation of Kantian ethics in mind. The theoretical foundation is used
as a kind of compass which allows the agent to locate herself in the moral landscape.”25 By
keeping the theoretical requirements of Kantian ethics firmly in mind, we are able to subvert
self-deception.
The novelty and appeal of O’Hagan’s suggestion should be apparent. On O’Hagan’s
view, self-knowledge is not precluded by self-opacity, but is rather the solution to the problem of
self-opacity. By paying attention to our inclinations and behavioral tendencies, we are less likely
to place the motive of self-interest where the moral law belongs; self-knowledge aids us in
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directing ourselves toward virtue in light of the particular drives to which we are susceptible.
While much recommends this account, it has at least two serious problems.
First, the notion that self-knowledge requires that agents reflect upon the theoretical
requirements of Kantian ethics is deeply implausible. Most human beings will never encounter
Kant’s theoretical apparatus, and any claim that human beings are, generally, required to make
explicit use of Kant’s moral framework sits uneasily with Kant’s own characterization of his
project as falling out of “common human reason” (GMS 4:393).
Second, though O’Hagan’s account of Kant’s first command provides a clear rationale for
the priority Kant assigns to self-knowledge, it does so only by begging the question. That is,
O’Hagan’s account assumes that we can have easy knowledge of our moral condition and those
inclinations that threaten it in situations in which it is threatened. But this is precisely what is at
issue when attempting to resolve the tension between Kant’s Opacity Thesis and his injunction to
know thyself. O’Hagan, accordingly, owes us an account of why self-deception does not block
us from making use of the knowledge of our tendencies to guide us in developing a pure
disposition.
Despite these problems with O’Hagan’s view, his overall characterization of the point of
Kant’s first command points us in the right direction. O’Hagen is right to suggest that part of the
reason that Kant assigns priority to self-knowledge is that self-knowledge conduces to moral
objectivity. From the above, it is now clear that O’Hagan fails to provide a non-question-begging
answer to the question of why it is that self-knowledge is likely to help moral agents to develop
objectivity, and how this sort of objectivity is possible in light of the problem of self-deception.
Although O’Hagen’s concern with objectivity does not (as we will see) capture the full reason
for Kant’s insistence that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of virtue, he does well to bring
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the issue of objectivity into view. On the face of it, it is plausible that, insofar as our moral duties
require that we be objective, or impartial (as Kant holds that they do), they also require that we
take the necessary steps to bring it about that we are capable of impartiality. If we have an
account of moral self-knowledge that gives us reason to believe that having moral selfknowledge is a necessary condition of impartiality, then we would appear to have the start of an
answer to the question of why it is necessary to obtain this sort of self-knowledge before we
undertake to discharge our responsibilities.
In what follows, I argue that, while moral self-knowledge does require attention to our
disposition, this sort of self-knowledge is not doing much (if any) explanatory work in grounding
Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of virtue. Rather, the sort of moral
self-knowledge that aids us in developing objectivity is what is referred to in the literature as
“generic” self-knowledge.26 I argue that generic self-knowledge is a necessary condition of
virtue because it (a) aids us, in a clear way, in developing moral objectivity and (b) requires that
conceive of ourselves as moral agents.
SECTION 3: SELF-KNOWLEDGE, OBJECTIVITY AND AGENCY

Recall that Kant's first command to know our heart requires that we understand “what can
be imputed to [us] as belonging originally to the substance of a human being” (MM 6:441). It is
not immediately clear what this strange sentence is supposed to tell us about the requirements of
self-knowledge. I think it is plausible to think that to understand what is imputable to us “as
belonging to originally to the substance of a human being,” is to understand ourselves as
members of the human species. When we understand ourselves in such a way, we infer that we

26

See Grenberg, Jeanine. Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue. New
York: Cambridge UP, 2005, pp. 224

20
(ourselves) partake in those attributes that characterize the “substance” of humanity in general.27
If this is correct, there are two ways of reading Kant’s claim that we must understand “what can
be imputed to [us] as belonging originally to the substance of a human being.”
One way to read Kant’s claim above would be to suggest that the requirement to know
what is imputable to us as members of the human species is reducible to the requirement to know
what is imputable to us as individuals. On this reading, knowing what is imputable to us as
human beings, generally, allows us to distinguish our unique contribution to our moral
condition—how much of our character we are responsible for—but it does not require us to
know anything over and above our own disposition. Perhaps it is better put like this: on this
reading, knowing what can be imputed to us qua substance serves as a helpful, perhaps
necessary, means toward knowing to what extent we have cultivated our disposition, which
remains the proper (and only) object of self-knowledge.
Another way to read this aspect of Kant’s first command would be to maintain that
knowing what is imputable to us qua substance is a unique requirement of the command to know
ourselves, not reducible to the requirement to know our contribution to our disposition. In this
case, we are required to know our contribution to our disposition in addition to what we are like
as members of the human species. Read in this way, attaining knowledge of ourselves, qua
human being, is necessary if one is to fully “know” one’s “heart.” Fully knowing your heart
requires both knowledge of the type of person you are, as well as knowledge of the types of
things persons are, or, better, of the types of hearts that persons have. Since the former type of
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knowledge is unable to explain why self-knowledge might be a necessary condition of virtue, it
is worth considering whether or not the latter requirement of Kant’s first command is in a better
position to offer such an explanation.
We have seen that Kant holds that we need to know ourselves before we are in a position
to cultivate a virtuous disposition. In what follows, I argue that understanding the full import of
this claim requires developing an account of what I will hereafter refer to as “generic” self
knowledge. By generic self-knowledge, I simply mean knowledge of oneself as a human being.
What we are required to know about ourselves, qua human being, provides a clear rationale for
Kant’s controversial position that we must know ourselves before our duties to ourselves and to
others can be pursued.
3.1 Generic Self-Knowledge
Surprisingly, other commentators28 have distinguished between these two potential
objects of self-knowledge (our disposition, on the one hand, and the characteristics of humanity
in general, on the other). Most conclude that generic self-knowledge is, at best, of secondary
importance. Its importance derives from its function as a backdrop against which we can discern
the quality of our idiosyncratic hearts. In this way, generic self-knowledge serves as a sort of
measuring stick for discerning the extent of our moral progress. If we know where we began, we
are in a better position to know how far we have come. Only Jeanine Grenberg has undertaken to
explicate what it would look like to take seriously the notion that we are supposed to know
ourselves as human beings in general, as a unique requirement of self-knowledge.29
Perhaps the tendency to relegate the second aspect of Kant’s first command to derivative
status is understandable. It seems admittedly strange to count knowledge about ourselves as
28
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human beings as self-knowledge at all: What we are as selves is what sets us apart from other
creatures like us. But, it is worth remembering the extent to which Kant saw his “critical”
philosophy as an exercise in self-knowledge, despite the fact that it does not concern itself at all
with the idiosyncrasies of individual persons.30 If I am correct in arguing that knowledge of what
can be imputed to us as belonging to the “substance” of the human being is basically knowledge
of ourselves as members of the human species, we must next determine which attributes of the
human species are relevant to Kant's inquiry. Human beings without congenital defects are
featherless bipeds, but surely this is not the sort of attribute that Kant has in mind.
I take it that, generally, knowing ourselves, qua human being, will require us to
understand ourselves in light of (a) what Kant calls the “radical propensity to evil” that inheres in
human nature, and (b) what he calls the human “predisposition to the good.” Kant holds that each
of these is, in some sense, a universal attribute of human beings. There is strong reason to believe
that this is the sort of knowledge Kant has in mind when he asserts that we must know what is
imputable to us as belonging to the “substance” human being. This is because Kant explicitly
mentions (b) and alludes to (a) immediately after introducing the first command itself (MM
6:441).
In what follows, I argue that Kant's inclusion of this kind of generic self-knowledge in his
first command provides a clear rationale for Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is conceptually
prior to our other moral responsibilities. I argue that (1) understanding the human predisposition
to evil helps us to develop moral objectivity in moral deliberation and (2) understanding
ourselves as predisposed to the good is a necessary condition of conceiving of ourselves as moral
agents.
30
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3.2 The Propensity to Evil and the Inducement to Objectivity
After claiming that we are commanded to attempt moral cognition of ourselves, Kant
writes that doing so will “counteract that egotistical self-esteem which takes mere wishes...for
proof of a good heart” (MM 6:441). This should remind us of O’Hagan’s claim that one function
of self-knowledge is to ward off self-conceit and self-illusion. Self-knowledge, it turns out, is
likely to have this effect because, on Kant’s conception of virtue, as Vigilantius records, “The
attainment of a total agreement [between an individual’s disposition and the pure disposition that
morality requires] is a thing that man is far removed from” (LE 27:609). When we cognize
ourselves, we necessarily perceive “the insignificance of our moral worth in consciousness of its
inadequacy to the law” (LE 27:610). However, as we have seen, merely attempting to know our
disposition is unlikely to counteract egotistical self-esteem in this way.
Indeed, when attempting to cognize ourselves in terms of our unique contribution to our
moral condition, we will not always notice the insignificance of our moral worth. Sometimes, we
will search only to find just what we hoped that we would find— that our disposition is pure.
But clearly, insofar as it is by forcing us to recognize our lack of moral worth in comparison with
the moral law that self-knowledge counteracts “egotistical self-esteem,” the assumption is that
everyone, when cognizing herself, will notice such a lack of worth. Notice the contrast between
the conclusions we are supposed to draw (as we attempt to discharge Kant’s first command) and
the conclusions that we are likely to draw (if the sole object of self-knowledge is our disposition).
To understand why Kant thought self-knowledge an antidote to moral arrogance, we must
understand that, for Kant, self-knowledge requires understanding what he calls the “propensity to
evil” (R 6:29-44).
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Kant holds that the propensity to moral evil “belongs to the human being universally” (R
6:29). Recall that, for Kant, evil consists in the subordination of the commands of morality to
one's inclinations. Kant holds that because experience furnishes us with so many examples of
this tendency, we can “spare ourselves the formal proof that there must be such a corrupt
propensity rooted in the human being” (R 6:32). Kant’s first command includes a requirement to
understand ourselves in terms of the human propensity to evil. This requirement of selfknowledge is doing most of the work to support Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is antithetical,
in a strong sense, to “egotistical self-esteem.”
Understanding ourselves in light of the human propensity to evil requires that we make
the inference that, as human beings, we, too, are marked out by this propensity.31 Accordingly,
generic self-knowledge is instrumental in allowing us to develop objectivity. In particular,
because we understand, by inference from facts we know about the species to which we belong,
that we are “far removed from” the ideal of virtue, we will (a) reject any conception of ourselves
as being fully virtuous (as might result from other attempts to evaluate ourselves) and,
accordingly, (b) conceive of our duties objectively. Thus, generic self-knowledge impels us to
assume, when evaluating the quality of our disposition, that we have almost certainly not
achieved virtue, and that, in this regard, there is much work to be done.
Now, one might plausibly think that, because one does not need proof (or even a very
discerning eye) to understand that humanity is characterized by a general propensity to evil,
knowledge of this propensity cannot be required at all. Hence, the argument goes, it certainly
cannot be a component of Kant’s “first command.” Owen Ware makes precisely this argument.
Ware writes that, because “the notion we have of humanity's corruption arises necessarily in
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experience... a duty to know it would be vacuous.”32 Since we must recognize in experience that
human beings are generically evil, it would be redundant to say that we have a duty to know that,
as members of the human species, we are, ourselves, generically evil as well. However, from the
fact that we recognize that human beings, in general, tend to treat their own happiness as
weightier than the commands of morality, it plainly does not follow that we recognize this fact
about ourselves.
Kant's concern that we might deceive ourselves makes it clear that we might (and, indeed,
that we often will) affirm, simultaneously, that (a) humanity has a general propensity to evil and
(b) that we, ourselves, are exempt from that generalization. If one thinks this implausible, one
need look no further than contemporary empirical psychology. Psychologists continue to find
evidence for what they have deemed the optimism bias: individual persons remain incredibly
optimistic about themselves, even while simultaneously holding negative views about human
nature, generally.33 As we have seen, we can never fully get beyond our tendency to self-deceive
and attribute to ourselves purer motives than we actually have. The reason that self-knowledge
requires us to make inference from the generic human propensity to evil, to our own evil
tendencies, then, is to provide us with a constant reminder that, for creatures like us, “virtue is
always in progress.” Beings like us can “never settle down in peace and quiet with [our] maxims
adopted once and for all” (MM 6:409). Virtue is an ideal that we must constantly strive to fulfill,
no matter how good we might judge our “moral condition” to be at any given time.
To summarize, if we take Kant’s claim that we must know what can be “imputed to us
originally as belonging to the substance of a human being,” to be a unique requirement of self-
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knowledge (not reducible to the command to know one’s disposition) it becomes clear why selfknowledge will help us to develop objectivity, why self-knowledge will “counteract egotistical
self-esteem.” After claiming that our duties command us to know ourselves, Kant observes that,
in striving toward virtue, we must attempt to remove “an obstacle” that inheres in every human
heart. It is now clear that the obstacle to which Kant refers is just the human propensity to evil
(see MM 6:441). This, in turn, sheds light on why it is that self-knowledge helps us fulfill our
duties. Simply put, understanding the general facts about human beings, and about ourselves, as
members of our species, makes us less likely to take our duties to ourselves and others lightly.
Even when we evaluate our disposition as pure, the universality of the propensity to evil will
induce us to assume that we have not yet succeeded in subordinating our inclinations to the
requirements of morality, that we have not done enough to warrant the judgment that we have set
obligatory ends. Having come to this realization, we will continue to strive, as best we can, to
effect a change, or “revolution,” within.
While developing objectivity by understanding the implications of the human propensity
to evil is bound to be helpful to us as we attempt to discharge our duties to self and others, one
might object that this is not sufficient to warrant Kant’s strong conclusion that self-knowledge is
a necessary condition of virtue. While objectivity might place us in a better position to fulfill our
duties, it simply is not the case that we are unable to address our duties prior to obtaining the
self-knowledge that makes objectivity possible. Kant’s position does not suggest merely that we
will be better able to do what duty requires of us if we know ourselves. He argues that if we do
not undertake to know ourselves, we will be incapable of addressing our duties at all. To
understand why Kant takes the stronger position here, it is crucial to understand the second
requirement of generic self-knowledge: The human predisposition to the good.
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3.3 The “Predisposition to the Good” and Moral Agency
Importantly, if it were the case that the only thing imputable to the human species were
radical evil, Kant’s moral psychology might be justifiably condemned as overly pessimistic (as
Goethe worried it had become). But Kant clearly did not intend for his moral psychology to
engender in us a sense of contempt for the species to which we belong. Indeed, Kant writes that,
in addition to helping us to dispense with “egotistical self-esteem,” attempting to know oneself
dispels “fanatical contempt for oneself as a human being (for the whole human race)” (MM
6:441).
Though we have been focusing so far on the extent to which self-deception entices us to
see ourselves as better than we actually are, Kant thinks that this is far from the only way that we
commonly deceive ourselves. Sometimes, we are prone to seeing ourselves as worthless, pushed
and pulled by our inclinations, wholly lacking agency, or worse. On Kant’s account, this latter
tendency involves just as much an error, perhaps even graver an error, as does the tendency
toward moral arrogance. Kant's claim that the human race is characterized by a propensity to evil
does not license misanthropy precisely because it is not to be understood in isolation.
Instead, Kant emphasizes that, even more important than understanding the implications
of the propensity to evil, is understanding ourselves as beings whose constitution is characterized
by a predisposition to the good (MM 6:441). Kant’s contention is that, by paying attention to our
capacities as rational beings, and in particular, to the extent to which human beings are, as he
puts it, “predisposed to the good,” we necessarily conceive of ourselves as moral agents.
Conceiving of ourselves in this way is antithetical to “fanatical self-contempt” because it reveals
to us the full extent of our moral potential. Conceiving of ourselves and those around us as moral
agents makes us less likely, in light of our moral failings (indeed, in light of the evil we see all
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around us), to give up on virtue. These considerations begin to bring into view Kant's complete
answer to the question of why Kant claims that self-knowledge is first command of all duties to
oneself.
Briefly after introducing his first command, Kant explicitly claims that he views
contempt for humanity as a contradiction. He then reminds us that it is only “through the noble
predisposition to the good in us, which makes the human being worthy of respect, that one can
find one who acts contrary to it contemptible” (ibid). There are at least two things of importance
to note here. First, in the above, Kant claims that the predisposition to the good is what makes
human beings worthy of respect; second, he claims that it is by virtue of the predisposition to the
good that we are capable of understanding the difference between good and evil. In this section,
with these central claims in mind, I elaborate on Kant’s conception of the predisposition to the
good, tying it together closely with what Kant calls “the fact of reason,” in the second Critique.
In particular, I claim that Kant's fact of reason (shorthand, I take it, for phenomenology Kant has
already laid out in the Groundwork) is what enables us to understand ourselves in terms of the
“predisposition to the good.” I then argue that it is only by virtue of what this “fact of reason”
tells us about ourselves that we are capable of seeing ourselves as moral agents. Finally, I argue
that this is the primary reason Kant thought self-knowledge so important. Quite literally, if we
fail to know ourselves, we will fail to see ourselves as moral agents. If we do not see ourselves as
moral agents, we will be incapable of (as opposed to merely unskilled at) cultivating virtue.
In the Religion, Kant breaks the predisposition to the good into three distinct
predispositions: the predisposition to animality, the predisposition to humanity, and the
predisposition to personality. Recall that, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that it is the
“noble predisposition to the good in us” that makes human beings the proper objects of respect
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(MM 6:441, emphasis added). Strikingly, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant makes the
same observation regarding our ability to respect the “moral law” as an incentive: It is by virtue
of our ability to respect the moral law and treat it as an incentive that we are worthy of respect
(KpV 5:87). Again, strikingly, Kant defines the predisposition to personality as our
“susceptibility to respect... the moral law as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of
choice” (R 6:28). Hence, it is reasonable to think that when Kant claims that it is the distinctly
noble predisposition to the good in us that makes human beings worthy of respect, he has in
mind that component of the predisposition to the good that he deems the predisposition to
personality. In the simplest possible terms, the predisposition to personality is what marks as out
as the types of creatures that are susceptible to the commands of morality in the first place.
I take myself here to be attributing to Kant a stronger claim than the one that Jeanine
Grenberg attributes to him in her recent book, Kant and the Ethics of Humility. There, Grenberg
writes that generic self-knowledge requires that we recognize ourselves as “dependent and
corrupt but capable and dignified rational agents.”34 Conceiving of ourselves in such a way,
according to Grenberg, is likely to remind agents to be humble when assessing their worth and
prevent them from becoming discouraged that they are incapable of fully attaining virtue. I take
it that this is an important insight. But it is not merely that Kant's first command requires that we
view ourselves as a particular type of agent (though it does require this). Commanding us to
recognize and understand ourselves as predisposed to the good is what enables us to see
ourselves as agents in the first place. And it is for this reason, above all others, that pursuing selfknowledge is a requirement of virtue.
At this point, one might wonder by what means we are to know ourselves in terms of the
predisposition to the good. Recall that the propensity to evil, as a requirement of generic self34
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knowledge, is readily knowable. In fact, one cannot spend much time among human beings
without noticing that they frequently fail to act as morality requires them to act. Evidence for the
predisposition to the good, on the other hand, appears to be somewhat harder to find. Not only
are there certain philosophers (Hobbes and Mandeville are good examples) that call into question
the notion human beings are capable of anything like moral agency, it appears that, in observing
ourselves and our fellows, we seldom have a very hard time seeing our way to a selfish
interpretation of even the most apparently dutiful action. In light of this, Kant needs to provide us
with an account of how it is possible to undertake to know oneself in terms of the predisposition
to good which does not readily show itself. It is my view that Kant's answer to this question can
be found in his second Critique.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that we are, in some sense, aware of “the
moral law” as a “fact of reason.” (KpV 5:30, 5:31, 5:32, 5:42, 5:43, 5:44, 5:47). Kant cannot
mean that the moral law, which he calls the categorical imperative in the Groundwork, is
something that human beings universally and necessarily represent to themselves during
deliberation in abstract form. Besides being highly implausible, Kant straightforwardly denies
that these abstract principles play any explicit role in our everyday practical reasoning (see: GMS
4:403).
Though we may never consciously represent the categorical imperative in the abstract
during deliberation, we are phenomenologically familiar with the sometimes unpleasant pull of
obligation toward certain ends, in spite of the fact that we incline toward others. I take this to be
a more phenomenologically apt way of saying that in deliberating and acting, we are aware of
the moral law as binding. This awareness that moral imperatives ought to trump imperatives that
result from our desires, if we pay sufficient attention to it, allows us to cognize ourselves as free.
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Reflection on the capacities that enable us to be free allows us to understand ourselves as beings
predisposed to the good, whose “highest practical vocation” is to develop a disposition in
conformity to virtue. In this way, Kant's fact of reason becomes an important means through
which we are able to see ourselves as predisposed to the good, in other words, as moral agents.
For Kant, beings like us have “two standpoints from which [we] can regard [ourselves]
and cognize laws for the use of [our] powers” (GMS 4:452). From the first standpoint, we view
ourselves as objects of the “sensible world,” and our wills determined by our inclinations “under
laws of nature,” hence, heteronomously (by external forces). From the second standpoint, we
view ourselves as members of the “intelligible world,” and our wills determined “under laws
which, being independent of nature, are not empirical but grounded merely in reason,” hence,
autonomously (by our selves) (ibid). Our capacity for autonomy, a robust sort of positive
freedom characterized by “freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of
nature,” is possible only because we are capable of determining our wills according to “special
laws.” These special laws are moral, rather than causal, laws. Reflecting on the fact of reason
compels us to see ourselves as free. We are never totally at the mercy of our inclinations. In turn,
the fact that our freedom is possible only in virtue of our being bound forces us to recognize
ourselves as moral agents. This connection between morality and freedom (which Kant thinks is
one of reciprocal implication, see: KpV 5:29) compels us to regard our “own nature in reference
to [our] second and highest vocation...and its laws with the highest respect” (KpV 5:87).
We understand as a fact of reason that morality requires that we subordinate our interests
to its commands. Accordingly, when given the choice between two acts, one of which satisfies
our inclinations and is immoral and the other of which requires the frustration of our desires, it is
not open to us to appeal to the strength of the latter as an excuse. This sort of freedom from

32
sensibility, made possible by our ability to act according to moral imperatives, is precisely what
constitutes autonomy, for Kant (KpV 5:31). If we replace this purely formal condition with other
conditions external to us (including our inclinations), then our will is no longer autonomous—its
determining ground lies in some sought-after object, in our desires, and hence, not in law-giving
reason. Despite this, by virtue of the predisposition to good that is present universally in human
beings, we always have the capacity for autonomous action, if only we recognize how our
rational capacities bind us. For Kant, therefore, if we are to properly understand ourselves and
the reasons for which we act, it is of the utmost importance to maintain the purity of the moral
law which “elevates a human being above himself...[and] connects him with an order of things
that only the understanding can think” (KpV 5:86-7).
Kant holds that, were it not for our awareness of the moral law, and for the autonomy that
the latter makes possible, we would not have any duties at all, nor would we be able to discern
good from evil (MM 6:417-8; 6:441). The primary reason that Kant holds self-knowledge to be a
necessary condition of virtue is that, if we do not look inward and recognize among the major
implication of this fact of reason (that we are predisposed to the good), we will fail to view
ourselves as properly having duties at all (LE 27:357).
The second requirement of generic self-knowledge, therefore, requires that we cognize
ourselves in our innate capacity to attribute “a free person” to ourselves to whom “all duties that
are incumbent on [us]...take account of” us as beings that act “in freedom” (LE 27:626). It
requires that we see ourselves as capable of placing ourselves under obligation, and it requires
that we see ourselves as capable of doing that which we're obligated to do. All of this is simply to
say that self-knowledge requires that we understand ourselves as predisposed to the good. We
are to understand ourselves as predisposed to the good by “cognizing” our intelligible selves,
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which is possible only in “morally practical relations,” that is to say, I think, by paying attention
to how we exercise our faculties during practical deliberation (MM 6:418).
Kant’s claim that self-knowledge is a necessary condition of virtue begins to look much
more plausible with these considerations in view. Our very recognition of the difference between
good and evil can be explained only in view of our being aware of the pull of obligation as a
“fact of reason.” Were we not the types of creatures endowed with such an awareness, we would
not be capable of seeing the human propensity to evil as a regrettable fact about us, or even as
something interesting, much less something that we should be striving to overcome.
One might object to this, however. If the commands of morality, and through them, the
conditions of our freedom, assert themselves upon us involuntarily—if we “must” conceive of
ourselves as free during rational deliberation—in what sense does it make sense to command us
to know them? Kant’s claim concerning the availability and necessity of our conceiving of
ourselves as autonomous moral agents seems to render a command to know it rather vacuous
(recall Ware's worry about the propensity to evil, now, though, from a different angle). Not only
does Kant call “the moral law” a fact of reason: in the Groundwork, after arriving at the first
formulation of the categorical imperative, Kant remarks that common human reason always has
the moral law “before its eyes and uses [it] as the norm for its appraisals” (GMS 4:403-4). But if
the moral law is found in even the most common human beings, even in “scoundrels,” it is
insufficiently clear why our duties command that we understand its implications.
I take it that a plausible answer to this compelling objection can be made only by
remaining sensitive to Kant’s worries that our understanding of the moral law might be
contaminated by the pervasive influence of self-interest. Later in the Groundwork, Kant notes
that because we are needy creatures with powerful inclinations, there arises within us a “natural
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dialectic,” which Kant further characterizes as a “propensity to rationalize against [the] strict
laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity” (GMS 4:405). Given the strength of our
desires, we are prone to make exceptions for ourselves against what morality requires. What's
worse is that sometimes this dialectic contaminates our understanding the moral law itself by
locating the metric of moral worth elsewhere, perhaps in the quality of our inclinations, rather
than in the extent to which we have a “disposition in accord with” the requirements of the moral
law” (KpV 5:73).
Kant writes that “we find our nature as sensible beings so constituted that the matter of
the faculty of desire (objects of inclination, whether of hope or fear) first forces itself upon us,
and we find our pathologically determinable self... striving antecedently to make its claims
primary and originally valid just as if it constituted our entire self” (KpV 5:74). The command to
know ourselves, then, requires that we refuse to view our desires as constituting our entire self.35
We are required to recognize that our desires and our past might go a long way in explaining
why we've done what we have done. But, if we are only honest with ourselves, we understand
that the latter are unable to act as the sorts of considerations that would ultimately excuse what
we have done (KpV 5:99).
If one takes the above considerations seriously, the inconsistency between Kant’s claim
that the all human beings operate with an implicit understanding of the nature of morality and my
argument that we are commanded to understand the implications of the latter disappear. We are
commanded to know ourselves, and, in doing so, to view ourselves as moral agents, because so
much in us recoils from the implications of the conclusion that we are autonomous. On this
35
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point, Kant’s position concerning moral self-knowledge has an illuminating analogue in his
discussion of enlightenment.
Kant characterizes enlightenment as “man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage;”
where nonage is then characterized as a special kind of immaturity consisting in our refusal to
think independently (E 1).36 According to Kant, many fully grown human beings refuse to shake
off this immaturity because of cowardice or laziness. Indeed, Kant writes, “If I have a book to
serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet
for me…I need not exert myself at all” (E 1, my emphasis).
Human beings, especially in an age of ever increasing communication and commerce,
have at their disposal a vast array of resources, which, in various respects, make life easier.
While an easier life is surely, on balance, a positive development in human history, it is just as
sure that ease is attended with certain dangers. Insofar as individuals take their beliefs from their
environment, from their church and from their education, and do not attempt to take an active
role in the process of belief-formation, they fail to live up to their moral potential. Insofar as
beliefs formed in such a way concern morality, the result is heteronomy of the will. Since the
content and origin of beliefs are each surely relevant to moral practice, this is especially
problematic.
If we merely take our beliefs from the world outside and then act on them, there is no
guarantee whatsoever that we are actually pursuing the same ends we would pursue if actively
laying down the law for ourselves. Indeed, on Kant’s account of action, it is not sufficiently clear
that our behavior will even qualify as “action,” as it may not follow from the adoption of
principles at all. Thus, J.B. Schneewind observes that the “failure of courage to use our own
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reason is a moral failure.”37 The solution to the problem of nonage that Kant identifies in his
essay on enlightenment is to employ courage in facing the facts about one's own intellectual
freedom. As a heuristic, he suggests that we ask ourselves whether “everyone could believe” on
grounds such as we believe. If not, we are failing to face courageously the burden that our
capacities as rational beings place upon us. Kant considers reflection on the requirements of our
own reason an antidote toward this self-imposed problem precisely because such requirements
assert themselves upon us involuntarily.
Concerning our intellectual responsibilities as well as our moral responsibilities, Kant
displays a strong (perhaps too strong) degree of confidence that, if only human beings are honest
with themselves in assessing the types of creatures that they are in light of the sort of capacities
that they make use of, they will realize that their passivity exhibits a form of bad faith. Far from
implying that a duty to understand the implication of what Kant calls “the fact of reason” would
be vacuous, the fact that awareness of the moral law is undeniable for creatures like us provides a
solution to the problem of self-imposed immaturity in moral, as well as intellectual matters.
SECTION 4: SELF-KNOWLEDGE, EPISTEMIC HUMILITY AND VIRTUE

The first command of all duties that we have to ourselves requires that we understand
ourselves in terms of our capacities and in terms of our constitution as finite, rational beings. One
might claim that this conjecture is deeply implausible. Kant is clear that we are commanded to
know our disposition, and that is the claim he should have made. To call knowledge of ourselves
as substance self-knowledge is a category mistake. If Kant thought that generic self-knowledge
was so important, he would not have proclaimed that the first command of all duties to oneself is
to “know thy heart.” Surely there is something to this objection. But, it seems undeniable that
37

Schneewind, J.B. "Toward Enlightenment: Kant and the Sources of Darkness." The Cambridge Companion to
Early Modern Philosophy. Ed. Donald Rutherford. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2006. 328-53.

37
part of what it will mean to know our heart is to know what type of heart we possess. In our case,
our human heart's makeup is rather simple. It consists of a strong desire to be happy and a strong
desire to be worthy of happiness.
We recognize, along with even the most “common human reason” that morality consists
essentially in the constitution of our will (GMS 4:393). When we attempt to know our
disposition, that is, how our will is constituted, we are forced to recognize that our own
contribution to its quality is beyond our reach. We cannot be sure, due to the presence of
countervailing incentives, that we have ever successfully acted for purely moral reasons. The fact
that morality requires that duty be the “sufficient incentive” that determines the will, in other
words implies we can never therefore know if we have fulfilled our duty. Recognition that we
are needy, finite beings whose interest in being happy is often placed ahead of our interest in
being worthy of happiness suggests to us that we probably have a long way to go in cultivating
the pure disposition that virtue requires. Recognition that we are moral agents endowed with the
capacity to determine our will autonomously impels us to recognize our moral potential. In light
of the epistemic limits that our complex psychology imposes upon us, knowledge of our generic
human hearts keeps us oriented toward our “highest practical vocation.”
One cannot help but notice the Socratic character of Kant’s First Command.38 After all, it
was Socrates, serving as Plato’s mouthpiece in The Republic, who first called our philosophical
attention to the inscription at Delphi, which reads, “Know Thyself.”39 It was Socrates, too, that
stressed, during his trial, that the hallmark of human wisdom (sophia) is constituted, in large
part, by the recognition of one’s own ignorance.40 Self-knowledge, for Kant, serves as a reminder
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of our ignorance, our tendency to infer too quickly that we have attained knowledge, on the one
hand, and an injunction to strive to fulfill our potential, on the other. This is, after all, why Kant
claims that “[m]oral cognition of oneself” is “the beginning of all human wisdom” (MM 6:441).
And, indeed, Kant's Socratism shows through here as well. Recall that for Socrates, wisdom is
constitutive of virtue. For Kant, as well, “the ultimate wisdom... consists in the harmony of a
human being's will with its final end,” which, for Kant is to cultivate virtue (ibid).
If we believe, after inspection, that our disposition leaves no space for blame, and is
hence pure, recognition of our ignorance, that is, of the extent to which our selves are opaque to
us, will humble us. Understanding ourselves as human, and hence as having a certain propensity
to evil, reminds us that judgments of ourselves as wholly virtuous are likely mistaken. Because
we cannot exempt ourselves from what we take to be the universal condition of our species, we
are humbled by this recognition. Through humility, we become more objective.41 One might
worry that this inability to know anything about our moral worth is likely to entice us to give up
on the project of virtue. This worry turns out groundless. Generic knowledge of our hearts, of
the types of creatures that we are requires us to come up against the moral law and through it, our
moral potential. In light of all the evil that inheres in human nature, we are moral agents
precisely because we recognize the authority of a law laid down for us by the activity of our own
rational faculties. Each requirement of generic self-knowledge enables us to fulfill the principal
duty that falls out of Kant’s First Command: that we are to be sincere in appraising our inner
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worth in comparison with our duty (MM 6:442). As J.B. Schneewind puts it, “In moral matters
we are all equally failures; but we all have essentially the same ability to get things right.”42
CONCLUSION
Self-knowledge, finally, is a necessary condition of virtue because if we do not attend to
the sorts of creatures that we are, we will fail to be the sorts of agents that morality requires us to
be. We will be prone to overestimate or underestimate our moral potential, which will lead us to
prematurely judge that we have discharged all of our duties on the one hand, or give up on them
completely on the other. Worse: if we remain completely ignorant of ourselves and the types of
creatures that we are, Kant holds that we will not recognize that we have duties at all. Part of
Kant's injunction to “know thy heart” requires that, as individuals, we strive to understand
ourselves as members of the human species. Our membership in this group carries with it certain
baggage that, if we are honest with ourselves, we must infer belong also to us as individuals.
Kant's first command requires that we understand the extent to which virtue is, for beings
like us, an ideal to strive after, that we are unlikely to fulfill. But it also requires that we keep in
clear view our potential as autonomous moral agents. Attention to the propensity to evil achieves
the first goal, and understanding ourselves as predisposed to the good achieves the second.
In the end, it seems Kant’s injunction, know yourself, is both simpler and more complex than it
might at first have appeared.
In the Preface of the first Critique, Kant quotes a piece of verse written by Persius. It
reads: “Dwell in your own house and you will know how simple your possessions are” (KrV
Axx). It is in this spirit that I think we should read Kant on the issue of moral self-knowledge. It
is easy to get distracted by Kant's claim that the object of self-knowledge is our disposition,
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which he has situated beyond our epistemic reach. But if we attend carefully to that which Kant
claims is achieved by attempting to know our hearts, it becomes apparent that much of what we
need to understand about ourselves is not, after all, idiosyncratic to us, and, in understanding this,
we will know, indeed, just how simple our possessions are.
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